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Abstract—Tor hidden services allow running Internet services
while protecting the location of the servers. Their main purpose
is to enable freedom of speech even in situations in which
powerful adversaries try to suppress it. However, providing
location privacy and client anonymity also makes Tor hidden
services an attractive platform for every kind of imaginable shady
service. The ease with which Tor hidden services can be set up
has spurred a huge growth of anonymously provided Internet
services of both types. In this paper we analyse the landscape
of Tor hidden services. We have studied 39824 hidden service
descriptors collected on 4th of Feb 2013: we scanned them for
open ports; in the case of 3050 HTTP services, we analysed
and classified their content. We also estimated the popularity of
hidden services by looking at the request rate for hidden service
descriptors by clients. We found that while the content of Tor
hidden services is rather varied, the most popular hidden services
are related to botnets. We also propose a method for opportunistic
deanonymisation of Tor Hidden Service clients. In addtiton, we
identify past attempts to track “Silkroad” by consensus history
analysis.
Keywords-Tor, hidden services, port scanning, classification
I. INTRODUCTION
Tor hidden services allow Tor users to offer various Internet
services like web publishing or messaging while keeping
the location of said services hidden. Other Tor users can
connect to them through so-called rendezvous points. Since
Tor added support for hidden services in 2004, many of
them have emerged; some enable freedom of speech (New
Yorker’s Strongbox [1], Wikileaks [2]) while others allow for
the exchange of contraband (the Silk Road market place [3])
or are used by botnets (Skynet [4]) for hiding the location of
command and control centers. More mundane services such as
the DuckDuckGo search engine [5] also exist as Tor hidden
services.
In order to find a hidden service one can use a Hidden Wiki
[6] or one of the specialized search engines [7]. Though such
resources are of a great use, the number of onion addresses
they offer is quite limited1 and is not sufficient for the full
analysis of the landscape of Tor hidden services. At the
same time mining the full collection of onion addresses is
prevented by several objective reasons: firstly, many hidden
service operators are not interested in their existence to be
widely known. Secondly, Tor is designed in such a way that
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1At the time of writing, three Hidden Wikis linked to 624 onion addresses
and ahmia.fi had 1033 onion addresses over which the search could be
made.
no central entity stores the entire list of onion addresses.
Furthermore, hidden services only rarely link to each other
– which impedes traditional crawling.
In this paper we first present a study of deployed Tor
hidden services. In order to overcome the above mentioned
limitations, we exploited a flaw which was discovered in [8]
and was present in Tor versions before 0.2.4.10-alpha. Using
this approach we collected 39824 unique onion addresses on
February 4rd, 2013 by running 58 Amazon EC2 instances.
We scanned the obtained list of hidden services for open ports,
estimated their popularity, and classified their content. Second,
we propose a method for opportunistic deanonymisation of Tor
Hidden Services clients. Third, we make a statistical analysis
of the Tor consensus history in order to identify past attemps
to track “Silkroad” hidden service.
II. BACKGROUND
In this sections we briefly describe Tor hidden services
architecture and mention key points of the flaws which allowed
us to mine the collection of onion addresses and opportunis-
tically deanonymise Tor hidden service clients. For a more
detailed description we refer the reader to [8].
A. Tor hidden services
Tor is a low-latency anonymity network based on the ideas
of onion routing and telescoping. Clients can have anonymous
communication to a server by proxying their traffic through
a chain (Circuit) of three Tor relays. Tor is a volunteer-
based network and anybody can run and advertise its own
Tor relay. However there is a small number of so called Tor
authorities which monitor self-advertised relays and maintain
and distribute among clients a list (Consensus) of relays which
satisfy some conditions: a relay should be be up; the number
of Tor relays per one IP address should not exceed two.
Tor Hidden Services are a feature which was introduced in
2004 to add responder anonymity to Tor. Specifically, hidden
services allow running an Internet service (e.g. a Web site,
SSH server, etc.) so that the clients of the service do not
know its actual IP address. This is achieved by routing all
communication between the client and the hidden service
through a rendezvous point which connects anonymous circuits
from the client and the server.
In order to make an Internet service available as a Tor
hidden service, the operator (Bob) configures his Tor software
which automatically generates new RSA key pair. The base-32
encoding <z> of the first 10 bytes of SHA-1 digest of the key
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2becomes the identifier of the hidden service (its onion address
is constructed from <z> by adding ”.onion” part).
When a client (Alice) wants to communicate with the hidden
service, she needs to know not only its onion address, but
also the public key and the list of introduction points. Due to
this Bob generates two service descriptors which contain this
information and uploads them to 6 hidden service directories.
A hidden services directory is a Tor relay which has an HSDir
flag assigned by Tor authorities; a Tor relay needs to be
operational for at least 25 hours to obtain this flag. The choice
of hidden service directories deterministically depends on the
onion address and current time. A hidden service changes
its responsible hidden service directories every 24 hours and
HS directories responsible for the previous timeperiod erase
its descriptor from the memory2. This results in that the
information about all existing hidden services at given time
is distributed over many Tor relays. If an adversary wants to
collect all existing onion addresses she would need to either
own quite many3 IP addresses or run a small set of relays
from small number of IP addresses for significant amount
of time. This is enforced by that the maximum number of
Tor relays on a single IP address that Tor authorities include
to the Consensus is 2. If more than two relays are running
on the same IP address, only two relays with the highest-
most measured bandwidth will appear in the Consensus. This
prevents an attacker from injecting many Tor relays from a
single IP address in order to collect onion addresses.
A flaw discovered in [8] allowed us to overcome the
limitation of two Tor relays per IP address and use only
58 IP addresses to gather our collection of onion addresses.
We now describe the key points of the flaw. While only two
relays per IP appear in the Consensus, all running relays are
monitored by the authorities; more importantly, statistics on
them is collected, including the uptime which is used to decide
which flags a relay will be assigned. We call relays appearing
in the Consensus active relays and those which run at the
same IP address but do not appear in the Consensus shadow
relays. Whenever one of the active relays becomes unreachable
and disappears from the Consensus, one of the shadow relays
becomes active, i.e. appears in the Consensus. This new active
relay will have all the flags corresponding to its real run time
and not to the time for which it was in the consensus. We call
this technique shadowing.
An attacker can use this as follows. She can rent n IP
addresses and run m relays on each of them for 25 hours
thus running n × m Tor instances in total. Though only 2n
of them should appear in the consensus, at the end of 25
hour time period all n × m relays will have HSDir flags.
The idea is to gradually make active relays unreachable to
the Tor authorities so that shadow relays become active and
thus gradually become hidden service directories for all hidden
services during 24 hours, thus collecting hidden services’
public keys (from which onion addresses are easily derived)
2Note that the expression to compute next responsible HS directories is
deterministic and an attacker can easily inject relays to the Tor network which
would become responsible HS directories.
3At the time of the experiments an attacker would need to own more than
300 IP addresses for at least 27 hours.
and measuring clients request rates.
B. Guard nodes
In order to significantly reduce the probability of traffic
confirmation attacks [9], [10] Tor developers introduced the
concept of entry guard nodes. A Tor client initially selects
a set of three guard nodes from among Tor relays which
have a Guard flag assigned to them. Whenever less than two
guard nodes from the set are reachable, new guard nodes are
chosen. A guard node remains in the set for a random duration
between 30 and 60 days. Then it is marked as expired and
removed from the set. Whenever a circuit is established, one
node from the set of Guard nodes is used for the first hop. An
attack presented in [8] allowed an attacker to deanonymise the
operator of a hidden service once an attacker’s relay becomes a
Guard node of the hidden service. In order to mount this attack,
the responsible hidden service directory controlled by the
attacker sends a specific traffic signature to the hidden service
immediately after the hidden service uploads its descriptor.
This signature is then detected at the guard node. In this paper
we adapt this attack to deanonymise clients of a Tor hidden
service.
III. PORT SCANNING HIDDEN SERVICES
In this section we provide statistics on open ports of Tor
hidden services. We scanned the full collection of 39824
onion addresses at different times between 14 and 21 Feb
2013. At the time of the scans hidden service descriptors were
available for 24511 addresses. In total, 22007 ports were found
open on these. For hidden services for which descriptors were
available, we obtained a coverage of 87% of all ports. The
full coverage could not be achieved since we scanned different
port ranges on different days and in a number of cases hidden
services which we partially scanned on one day went off-line
the day of the next scan; when scanning some hidden services
we were persistently getting timeout errors.
During the scan we noticed that a large amount of hidden
services did not have any open ports, however when scanned
for port 55080 they returned an error message different from
the usual error message. According to the Rapid7 blog post
[4] port 55080 corresponds to hidden services created on
computers infected by a botnet malware called “Skynet”.
The observation is explained by the fact that the malware
immediately closes any connection to this port unless it has
been set up as a connection forwarder. We received such an
“abnormal” error message for port number 55080 only and
counted such events as open ports.
The open ports distribution is shown in Fig. 1. Port number
55080 is the most frequent one, found open on more than
50% of all onion addresses. This can be used to estimate the
number of computers infected by “Skynet”. HTTP and HTTPS
services constitute 22% and SSH services are run by 5% of
hidden services. Ports not shown on Fig. 1 have counts of less
than 50 and are grouped together under “Other” label. In total
we found 495 unique port numbers.
During our port scan we discovered that a number of
hidden services provided HTTPS access. We discovered that
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Fig. 1. Open ports distribution
in 1,225 cases the certificates were self signed and the
certificates’ common names did not match the requested
host names. In 1,168 cases the certificate common name
was “esjqyk2khizsy43i.onion” which is hosted at free onion
hosting service “TorHost”. We found 34 hidden services using
certificates containing common names corresponding to their
public DNS names, allowing for deanonymization of the
service.
IV. CONTENT ANALYSIS
In this section we present an analysis of the content of
hidden services which provide HTTP(S) access: we classify
them both according to topics and languages. We excluded
port 55080 and tried to connect to the remaining 8,153 des-
tinations (onion address:port pairs) using HTTP and HTTPS.
We performed the crawl 2 months after the port scan4. At the
time of the crawl, 7,114 ports were open – of these, we were
able to connect to 6,579 using either HTTP or HTTPS. Table
I shows the number of hidden services that offered HTTP or
HTTPS services.
Port Num # of onion addresses
80 3741
443 1289
22 1094
8080 4
Other 451
TABLE I
HTTP AND HTTPS ACCESS
About half of the destinations were inappropriate for clas-
sification so we excluded them and ended up with 3050
destinations. In more detail we excluded: 2348 destinations
which contained less then 20 words of text (this included
1092 messages from port 22 which were SSH banners); 1108
destinations at port 443 which had corresponding copies at port
80; 73 destinations which returned an error message embedded
in an HTML page.
For language detection we used “Langdetect” [11] software.
The vast majority of the hidden services (84%) were in
English. This is an expected result and corresponds to the
statistics for the public Internet [12]. Overall we found hidden
services in 17 different languages. Content was offered in the
4We excluded all binary data such as images, executables, etc.
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Fig. 2. Tor Hidden services topics distribution
following languages besides English (each constituting less
than 3%): German, Russian, Protuguess, Spanish, French, Pol-
ish, Japanese, Italian, Czech, Arabic, Dutch, Basque, Chinese,
Hungarian, Bantu, Swedish.
We used the software “Mallet” [13] and the web service
“uClassify” [14] for automatic topic classification. We con-
sidered only hidden services which offered pages in English
(2,618 hidden services in total). Among them, 805 hidden
services showed the default page of the Torhost.onion5 free
anonymous hosting service. We classified the remaining 1,813
onion addresses into 18 different categories.
Resources devoted to drugs, adult content, counterfeit (sell-
ing counterfeit products, stolen credit card numbers, hacked
accounts, etc.), and weapons constitute 44%. The remaining
56% are devoted to a number of different topics: “Politics” and
“Anonymity” are among the most popular (9% and 8% corre-
spondingly). In the “Politics” category, one can find resources
for reporting and discussing corruption, repressions, violations
of human rights and freedom of speech, as well as leaked
cables, and Wikileaks-like pages; the category “Anonymity”
includes resources devoted to discussion of anonymity from
both technical and political points of views as well as services
which provide different anonymous services like anonymous
mail or anonymous hosting.
The category “Services” includes pages which offer money
laundering, escrow services, hiring a killer or a thief, etc. In
“Games” one can find a chess server, lotteries, and poker
servers which accept bitcoins. While making a preliminary
analysis of the collected onion address names we noticed that
15 of them had prefix “silkroa” (two “official” addresses of
the silkroad marketplace and the silkroad forum were among
them). At least one of these addresses is a a phishing site
imitating the real Silk Road login interface.
V. POPULARITY MEASUREMENT
In the previous sections we have analyzed the Tor hidden
services landscape from the supply side. The analysis however
will not be complete without estimating the popularity of
different hidden services among clients. This becomes possible
since the method we used to collect onion addresses also
allows us to get the number of client requests for each of
5torhostg5s7pa2sn.onion
4them in a 2 hour period. This can serve as an approximation
of the popularity of hidden services.
During our experiments, we received a total of 1,031,176
requests for 29,123 unique descriptor IDs6. We used our
database of onion addressees to resolve the descriptor ID re-
quests. For each address in the list we computed corresponding
descriptor IDs for each day between 28 January 2013 and 8
February in order to deal with possible wrong time settings of
Tor clients. We compared this list of derived descriptor IDs
with the list of client requests. In this way we resolved 6,113
descriptor IDs to 3,140 different onion addresses.
In order to explain the small fraction of resolved descriptor
IDs, we ran several hidden service directories for a number
of days. From the log files we could derive that 80% of
the clients’ requests were for non-existent descriptors (i.e.
which were never published). Also only 10% of published
descriptors were ever requested by clients. Given that the
number of collected onion addresses is 39824, we believe that
the small number of resolved descriptor IDs was caused by
clients requesting descriptors which did not exist. We do not
have a good explanation for this phenomenon (one explanation
could be that specialized Hidden Service search engines were
trying to connect to services from their databases which did
not exist anymore), but this was a consistent behaviour over
several months.
Table II shows the number of requests for the most popular
hidden services. We explored the five most popular addresses
in more detail. Searching for them using the major search
engines did not give any result – this already seemed quite
strange for very popular hidden services. They only exposed
port 80; connecting to them at this port returned 503 Server
errors. As a next step, we tried to retrieve server-status
pages, which succeeded. By analysing these pages we noticed
that traffic to these servers remained constant at about 330
KBytes/sec and had about 10 client requests per second,
almost exclusively POST requests. Looking at other hidden
services we discovered another 4 onion addresses with the
very same characteristics: they had port 80 open, they were
returning 503 server errors, and had server-status page avail-
able. They also had similar traffic and client request rates.
By looking at the uptime of the Apache server on the server-
status pages we noticed that they could be divided into two
groups with exactly same uptime within each group. From
this we assumed that different hidden services lead to two
physical servers. Given a huge number of requests, we made
a conclusion that these hidden services belong to a very large
botnet infrastructure (probably different from Skynet, we call
it “Goldnet”). It is also worthwhile to notice that 10 onion
addresses of “Skynet” were also among the most popular
hidden services (residing between 10th and 28th places).
The Skynet bitcoin pooling servers are the second most
popular, just after the probable botnet. However their request
rate is 4 time lower. Bitcoin mining servers are followed by
resources offering adult content (there were 8 such resources
6The descriptor ID is not equivalent to the onion address. While the onion
address remains fixed, the descriptor ID changes every 24 hours and is derived
from the onion address. Specifically, it is used to fetch hidden service’s public
key. See [8] for more details.
among the 30 most popular hidden services). According to our
results, the Silk Road market place is at 18th place with 1175
requests per 2 hours. Black Market Reloaded (another market
for illegal goods) is at 62th place with 172 requests. With
regard to the popularity of other hidden services, Freedom
hosting is at 27th place with 694 requests, and the Duck-
DuckGo search engine is at 157th place with 55 requests. The
public bitcoin mining pools Slush and Eligius had two and
zero requests respectively.
VI. TRACKING CLIENTS
In [8], the authors used a specific traffic signature for
opportunistic deanonymisation of hidden services. The tech-
nique they used can be easily modified for opportunistic
deanonymisation of Tor Hidden Services clients.
Assume that an attacker controls a responsible HS directory7
of a hidden service. Whenever it receives a descriptor request
for that hidden service, it sends it back encapsulated in a
specific traffic signature which will be then forwarded to the
client via its Guard node. With some probability, the client’s
Guard node is in the set of Guards controlled by the attacker.
Whenever an attacker’s Guard receives the traffic signature, it
can immediately reveal the IP address of the client.
This attack has several important implications. Suppose
that we can categorize users on Silk Road into buyers and
sellers. Buyers visit Silk Road occasionally while sellers visit
it periodically to update their product pages and check on
orders. Thus, a seller tends to have a specific pattern which
allows his identification. Catching even a small number of Silk
Road sellers can seriously spoil Silk Road’s reputation among
other sellers.
As another application, one can collect IP addresses of
clients of a popular hidden service and compute a map
representing their geographical location. We have computed
such a map for one of the Goldnet hidden services – in Figure
3.
Fig. 3. Clients of a popular hidden service
7 Responsible hidden service directories of a hidden service are used to store
the hidden service’s descriptor (which contains its public key) for a period 24
hours. The HS directories are chosen among all Tor relays – different hidden
services usually have different responsible HS directories.
5# RQSTS Addr Desc # RQSTS Addr Desc
1 13714 uecbcfgfofuwkcrd.onion Goldnet 22 899 qdzjxwujdtxrjkrz.onion Skynet
2 11582 arloppepzch53w3i.onion Goldnet 23 898 6tkpktox73usm5vq.onion Skynet
3 11315 pomyeasfnmtn544p.onion Goldnet 24 889 kk2wajy64oip2***.onion Adult
4 7324 lqqciuwa5yzxewc3.onion Goldnet 25 781 gpt2u5hhaqvmnwhr.onion Skynet
5 7183 eqlbyxrpd2wdjeig.onion Goldnet 26 746 smouse2lbzrgeof4.onion <n/a>
6 6852 onhiimfoqy4acjv4.onion <n/a> 27 694 xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion FreedomHosting
7 6528 saxtca3ktuhcyqx3.onion Goldnet 28 667 f2ylgv2jochpzm4c.onion Skynet
8 4941 qxc7mc24mj7m4e2o.onion <n/a> 29 585 kdq2y44aaas2a***.onion Adult
9 3746 mwjjmmahc4cjjlqp.onion BcMine 30 542 4pms4sejqrryc***.onion Adult
10 3678 mepogl2rljvj374e.onion Skynet . . . . . . ... . . .
11 2573 m3hjrfh4hlqc6***.onion Adult 34 453 dkn255hz262ypmii.onion SilkRoad(wiki)
12 1950 ua4ttfm47jt32igm.onion Skynet . . . . . . ... . . .
13 1863 opva2pilsncvt***.onion Adult 47 255 dppmfxaacucguzpc.onion TorDir
14 1665 nbo32el47o5cl***.onion Adult . . . . . . ... . . .
15 1631 firelol5skg6e***.onion Adult 62 172 5onwnspjvuk7cwvk.onion BlckMrktReloaded
16 1481 niazgxzlrbpevgvq.onion Skynet . . . . . . ... . . .
17 1326 owbm3sjqdnndmydf.onion Skynet 157 55 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion DuckDuckGo
18 1175 silkroadvb5piz3r.onion Silk Road . . . . . . ... . . .
19 1094 candy4ci6id24***.onion Adult 250 30 x7yxqg5v4j6yzhti.onion Onion Bookmarks
20 1021 x3wyzqg6cfbqrwht.onion Skynet . . . . . . ... . . .
21 942 4njzp3wzi6leo772.onion Skynet 547 10 torhostg5s7pa2sn.onion Tor Host
TABLE II
RANKING OF MOST POPULAR HIDDEN SERVICES
VII. TRACKING DETECTION
The current implementation of Tor allows one to control
responsible hidden service directories of a hidden service. This
enables tracking of clients requests. In this section we show
that such tracking can be identified using statistical analysis of
the consensus history. We apply our analysis to “Silk Road”8
market place as an example but it can be applied to any other
service as well.
Before proceeding with the analysis we need to dwell on
the details of the Tor Hidden Services protocol. For clients to
be able to connect, a hidden service announces its existence
and provides contact information; every 24 hours it calculates
two new service descriptors and for each service descriptor
3 responsible hidden service directories are designated from
the set of Tor relays with HSDir flag. The descriptors are
then uploaded to the responsible hidden service directories. We
call an interval between two consecutive descriptor uploads as
“time period”. In order for a relay to obtain an HSDir flag it
needs to be online for at least 25 hours.
A relay with an HSDir flag becomes a responsible HSDir if
its fingerprint (the SHA-1 digest of its public key), is one of
the 3 fingerprints that follow the hidden service descriptor’s
ID. A hidden service descriptor contains all the information
necessary to establish a connection to the hidden service.
In our analysis we identify nodes with non-random be-
haviour. First we look at the number of times a Tor relay was
a responsible directory for a hidden service. At the beginning
of each time period, a hidden service chooses 6 responsible
HSDir’s anew. The probability for a relay to be chosen equals
p = 6/Nhsdir, where Nhsdir is the total number of relays
with HSDir flag. Assuming this probability stays constant, the
number of time periods a Tor relay is chosen during n days
has binomial distribution with mean µ = np and standard
deviation σ =
√
np(1− p). If number of times a particular
8We only considered the silkroadvb5piz3r.onion address
Tor relay was chosen exceeds µ + 3σ we mark this relay as
suspicious.
Second, if a Tor relay changes its fingerprint shortly before
becoming a responsible HSDir for a descriptor, it is probable
that it was done on purpose. The same is also true if a server
becomes a responsible HSDir 25 hours after its appearance in
the consensus, i.e the minimum amount of time necessary to
obtain an HSDir flag. We mark a Tor relay as suspicious if
we observed such behaviour several times.
Third, we sort fingerprints (as integers) of relays with
HSDir flag and calculate the ratio :avg dist/distance where
avg dist is the average distance9 between consecutive fin-
gerprints and distance is the distance between a responsible
HSDir and the corresponding descriptor ID. An attacker would
try to position her relay’s fingerprint as close to the two
descriptor ID as possible in order to increase her chances of
staying one of the 6 responsible HSDir’s for the whole time
period.
Fourth we consider the number of times a server switched
its fingerprint. Switching public keys in the 3 year period is
to be expected but a high number of switches in a short time
period is unusual.
Finally we looked at servers that were responsible HSDir’s
for consecutive time periods.
Now we apply these rules for the “Silkroad” analysis. Silk
road was launched in February 2011 and was closed by the
FBI on October 2nd 2013 [15]. Since we use the number of
servers in our calculation of the standard deviation, and the
number of HSDir more than doubled in the considered time
period 10, we split our analysis in 3 years.
In the first year11 there is no clear indication of tracking.
A number of servers are responsible HSDir’s for many time
9By distance we mean difference where fingerprints are taken as integer
numbers
101st of February 2011 : 757, 31st of October 2013 : 1862
111 Feb 2011 - 31 Dec 2011
6periods and hours but (1) the time periods seem to be ran-
domly distributed, and (2) the servers which were responsible
HSDir’s more frequently than µ + 3σ did not change their
fingerprints nor controlled consecutive time periods.
One server shows a strange behaviour: most of the time it
does not have an HSDir flag, however in 3 occasions, it obtains
it when “Silkroad” would choose it as a responsible HSDir.
The second year12 we found our own servers which per-
formed fingerprint changes on multiple occasions, each time
with a close distance13 between the fingerprint and the hidden
service descriptor ID.
The third year 14 shows clear evidence of at least two cases
of tracking. From May 21st to June 3rd a set of servers that
share the same name, take over 1 out of 6 HSDir’s for ”Silk
Road”. They skip only 4 time period during this timespan. A
more detailed look into these servers shows that they changed
fingerprints in order to become HSDir for ”Silk Road”. They
are also the only responsible HSDir’s that cross a ratio of
10k. On the 31st of August 2013 6 other Tor relays (sharing
common parts in their names) from 3 different IP addresses
become the responsible HSDir’s for ”Silk Road”. For all 6
HSDir’s the distance between their fingerprints and respective
descriptor IDs is very small.
We can conclude, that ”Silk Road” has not only been
tracked by us but also by other entities. There seems to be
no indication that someone tried to track ”Silk Road” before
November 2012 and only one entity has taken over all 6
HSDir’s for a single time period, a month before the takedown
by the FBI. Note that statistically it is impossible to distinguish
attempts to track a hidden service for one time period only
from the case when a relay becomes a responsible HSDir by
chance.
Based on our experiments we can conclude that looking
for changes in fingerprints, in combination with the distance
between the descriptor ID and the fingerprint seems to be the
most reliable way to detect tracking.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Tor hidden services are often criticized for being shelter
for resources with illegal or controversial content. The ar-
guments used are usually based on services such as “Silk
Road” marketplace or child pornography. On the contrary, Tor
enthusiasts point out that many hidden services are in fact
resources devoted to human rights, freedom of speech and
information which is prohibited in countries with oppressive
regimes. Obviously both types of services exist, but it is
unclear which type prevails. Obtaining such statistics in the
past was prevented by a number of reasons: hidden service
descriptors are stored in a distributed fashion; there is no
central entity storing the full list of onion addresses; the
number of onion addresses published on the Internet is far
from exhaustive.
In this paper we have mined a collection of hidden services
descriptors by exploiting a protocol and implementation flaws
121 Jan 2012 - 31 Dec 2012
13ratio bigger than 100
141 Jan 2013 to 31 Oct 2013
in Tor and derived onion addresses from them. The data
collected allowed us to analyse the landscape of Tor hidden
services. We scanned the obtained list for open ports, classified
the content of Tor hidden services that provide HTTP(S) ser-
vice, and estimated the popularity of obtained onion addresses.
We discovered a huge number of hidden services that are part
of the “Skynet” botnet by looking for port number 55080.
According to our analysis the most popular services are HTTP,
HTTPS, and SSH. We found that the content of Tor hidden
services is rather varied. The number of hidden services with
illegal content or devoted to illegal activities and the number
of other hidden services (devoted to human rights, freedom of
speech, anonymity, security, etc.) is almost the same; among
Tor hidden services one can even find a chess server.
Statistics of the popularity of hidden services look more
distressing, however. The most popular onion addresses are
command and control centers of botnets and resources serving
adult content. The Silk Road market place is among 20 most
popular hidden services.
In addition, we proposed a method for opportunistic
deanonymisation of hidden service clients and applied it to
a popular hidden service.
Finally, we proposed a method to analyse the consensus
history to detect tracking of a hidden service. We applied it to
“Silkroad” and were able to find 3 clear cases of tracking one
of which was caused by our own experiments. In the second
case an entity was controlling 1 responsible HSDir but for a
large timespan. In the third case an entity was controlling all
6 responsible HSDirs continuously for 24 hours.
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